1
0

tweak(path-util): addendum to #4482 (#4486)

* tweak(path-util): addendum to #4482

These changes improve on those introduced in #4482 in two ways:

- The serialization logic for `SafeRelativeUtf8UnixPathBuf` now more
  closely mirrors the deserialization checks, reducing the chance that a
  generated path will fail to deserialize. While unlikely in practice,
  catching such theoretical cases earlier improves the experience for
  users and developers.
- After deeper testing on a clean Windows 10 VM, I found that reserved
  device names can have both an extension and an alternate data stream
  appended, not just one or the other. These changes handle that case
  more gracefully.

* chore: fix typos, add tests

* fix(path-util): extend `SafeRelativeUtf8UnixPathBuf` contract to allow `.` components

While quite useless, they were accepted by previous app versions, the
`.mrpack` specification does not forbid them, and they do not pose
security issues, so accept them for backwards compatibility.
This commit is contained in:
Alejandro González
2025-10-04 18:10:01 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent ab6e9dd5d7
commit 98269842f3
2 changed files with 79 additions and 43 deletions

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ edition.workspace = true
[dependencies]
typed-path.workspace = true
serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
serde.workspace = true
derive_more = { workspace = true, features = ["display", "deref"] }
itertools.workspace = true

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ use serde::{
Deserialize, Deserializer, Serialize, Serializer,
de::value::StringDeserializer,
};
use typed_path::{Utf8Component, Utf8TypedPathBuf, Utf8UnixPathBuf};
use typed_path::{
Utf8Component, Utf8TypedPathBuf, Utf8UnixComponent, Utf8UnixPathBuf,
};
#[derive(
Eq, PartialEq, Hash, Debug, Clone, derive_more::Display, derive_more::Deref,
@@ -25,53 +27,24 @@ impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for SafeRelativeUtf8UnixPathBuf {
));
};
// At this point, we may have a pseudo-Unix path like `my\directory`, which we should reject
// to guarantee consistent cross-platform behavior when interpreting component separators
if path.as_str().contains('\\') {
return Err(serde::de::Error::custom(
"File path must not contain backslashes",
));
}
let mut path_components = path.components().peekable();
if path_components.peek().is_none() {
return Err(serde::de::Error::custom("File path cannot be empty"));
}
// All components should be normal: a file or directory name, not `/`, `.`, or `..`
if path_components.any(|component| !component.is_normal()) {
return Err(serde::de::Error::custom(
"File path cannot contain any special component or prefix",
));
}
if path_components.any(|component| {
let file_name = component.as_str().to_ascii_uppercase();
// Windows reserves some special DOS device names in every directory, which may be optionally
// followed by an extension or alternate data stream name and be case insensitive. Trying to
// write, read, or delete these files is usually not that useful even for malware, since they
// mostly refer to console and printer devices, but it's best to avoid them entirely anyway.
// References:
// https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/naming-a-file#naming-conventions
// https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20031022-00/?p=42073
// https://github.com/wine-mirror/wine/blob/01269452e0fbb1f081d506bd64996590a553e2b9/dlls/ntdll/path.c#L66
const RESERVED_WINDOWS_DEVICE_NAMES: &[&str] = &[
"CON", "PRN", "AUX", "NUL", "COM1", "COM2", "COM3", "COM4",
"COM5", "COM6", "COM7", "COM8", "COM9", "COM¹", "COM²", "COM³",
"LPT1", "LPT2", "LPT3", "LPT4", "LPT5", "LPT6", "LPT7", "LPT8",
"LPT9", "LPT¹", "LPT²", "LPT³", "CONIN$", "CONOUT$",
];
RESERVED_WINDOWS_DEVICE_NAMES.iter().any(|name| {
file_name == *name
|| file_name.starts_with(&format!("{name}."))
|| file_name.starts_with(&format!("{name}:"))
})
// All components should be normal: a file or directory name, not `/`, or `..`,
// and not refer to any reserved Windows device name. Also, at this point we may have
// a pseudo-Unix path like `my\directory`, which we should reject by filtering out
// backslashes to guarantee consistent cross-platform behavior when interpreting component
// separators
if !path_components.all(|component| {
(component.is_normal() || component.is_current())
&& !component.as_str().contains('\\')
&& !is_reserved_windows_device_name(&component)
}) {
return Err(serde::de::Error::custom(
"File path contains a reserved Windows device name",
"File path cannot contain any special component, prefix, reserved Windows device name, or backslashes",
));
}
@@ -90,9 +63,13 @@ impl Serialize for SafeRelativeUtf8UnixPathBuf {
return Err(serde::ser::Error::custom("File path cannot be empty"));
}
if path_components.any(|component| !component.is_normal()) {
if !path_components.all(|component| {
(component.is_normal() || component.is_current())
&& !component.as_str().contains('\\')
&& !is_reserved_windows_device_name(&component)
}) {
return Err(serde::ser::Error::custom(
"File path cannot contain any special component or prefix",
"File path cannot contain any special component, prefix, reserved Windows device name, or backslashes",
));
}
@@ -110,3 +87,62 @@ impl TryFrom<String> for SafeRelativeUtf8UnixPathBuf {
Self::deserialize(StringDeserializer::new(s))
}
}
fn is_reserved_windows_device_name(component: &Utf8UnixComponent) -> bool {
let file_name = component.as_str().to_ascii_uppercase();
// Windows reserves some special DOS device names in every directory, which may be optionally
// followed by an extension or alternate data stream name and be case insensitive. Trying to
// write, read, or delete these files is usually not that useful even for malware, since they
// mostly refer to console and printer devices, but it's best to avoid them entirely anyway.
// References:
// https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/naming-a-file#naming-conventions
// https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20031022-00/?p=42073
// https://github.com/wine-mirror/wine/blob/01269452e0fbb1f081d506bd64996590a553e2b9/dlls/ntdll/path.c#L66
const RESERVED_WINDOWS_DEVICE_NAMES: &[&str] = &[
"CON", "PRN", "AUX", "NUL", "COM1", "COM2", "COM3", "COM4", "COM5",
"COM6", "COM7", "COM8", "COM9", "COM¹", "COM²", "COM³", "LPT1", "LPT2",
"LPT3", "LPT4", "LPT5", "LPT6", "LPT7", "LPT8", "LPT9", "LPT¹", "LPT²",
"LPT³", "CONIN$", "CONOUT$",
];
RESERVED_WINDOWS_DEVICE_NAMES.iter().any(|name| {
file_name.starts_with(name)
&& (file_name[name.len()..].is_empty()
|| file_name[name.len()..].starts_with('.')
|| file_name[name.len()..].starts_with(':'))
})
}
#[test]
fn safe_relative_path_deserialization_contract() {
let valid_paths = [
"file.txt",
"directory/file.txt",
"my-directory/file.name.with.dots.tar.gz",
"my_directory/123_456-789.file",
"./my/file.txt",
"my/./file.txt",
];
for path in valid_paths {
SafeRelativeUtf8UnixPathBuf::try_from(path.to_string())
.expect("Path should be considered valid");
}
let invalid_paths = [
"", // Empty path
"/absolute/file.txt", // Absolute path
"C:/absolute/file.txt", // Absolute path with common Windows prefix
"//server/share/file.txt", // Absolute path with Windows UNC prefix
"directory/../file.txt", // Path with `..` component
"CON.txt", // Reserved Windows device name
"NUL/file.txt", // Reserved Windows device name "directory"
"COM1.txt:ads", // Reserved Windows device name with ADS name
"file\\name.txt", // Backslash in file name
"my\\directory/file.txt", // Backslash in directory name
];
for path in invalid_paths {
SafeRelativeUtf8UnixPathBuf::try_from(path.to_string())
.expect_err("Path should be considered invalid");
}
}